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Abstract 
 
Adam Smith’s proposal for paying professors was intended to induce increased faculty knowledge. If 
students have imperfect information about what they learn, and universities can only imperfectly measure 
the input of faculty time in student learning, publications may be used to measure faculty knowledge. If 
professors’ ability to publish is positively related to their ability to produce student learning, which 
universities can imperfectly measure, publications may be necessary to attract more able professors. Since 
research signals faculty knowledge, schools that do not value publications per se could  require higher 
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1. Introduction. 
  Adam Smith criticized the quality of teaching in the (allegedly) great English universities 
(Rosenberg, 1979). Smith believed professorial pay should be based on student assessment of teaching 
quality (Rosen, 1987). When he taught at the University of Glasgow, professors were paid a fixed annual 
salary and also received fees collected by the faculty from students.
1 The objective in this paper is to 
consider pay schemes a university might use to induce professors to allocate their time to maximize a 
university’s objective function that includes the level of student knowledge created. We consider a 
university’s optimal choice of teaching and publication standards, how these choices are affected by a 
school’s valuation of publications per se versus student learning, and what these choices imply regarding 
wages and time spent at work at different types of school. With Smith’s critique in mind, several points 
are noteworthy.  
  First, although Smith endorsed the payment of fees by students to professors, this specific method 
of pay is not what is important. Currently, many universities base faculty pay raises on student 
evaluations, which can accomplish Smith’s objective of tying faculty pay to student input. Making 
professors’ pay sensitive to student assessment of teaching does not require the explicit payment of fees 
from students to faculty.
2 
  Second, in Smith’s time, education was basically a consumption good. In the US, from 1636 until 
the late nineteenth century, universities were small and supplied ministers and “gentlemen” with a moral 
education not related to careers (McCormick and Meiners, 1988). If a student simply wishes to learn 
Shakespeare or a foreign language, it is relatively easy for the student to determine how much has been 
learned.
3 Similarly, for narrow vocational education, it may not be difficult to test to see what students 
                                                      
1 At some point, a professor was entitled to a house that could be used to board students and earn additional income. The majority of Smith’s 
income may have come from student fees and income from boarders. Smith’s salary in 1764 was 44 pounds sterling. His annual income appears 
to have ranged from 150 to 300 pounds sterling, about 100 pounds of which came from fees, and, as much as 100 pounds of which came from 
boarders. See Scott (1937). 
2 Rosen (1987) argued education now reflects a complex bundling and certification problem, so there is no reason for the payment of fees by 
individuals to instructors. Also, he believed the real problem in British universities was the absence of competition. These reasons 
notwithstanding, faculty performance should be a function of the method by which they are paid, and, thus the extent to which student input 
determines faculty pay may be important.  
3 “When a young man goes to a fencing or a dancing school, he does not, indeed, always learn to fence or to dance well; but he seldom fails of 
learning to fence or dance” (Smith, 1976, p.764). One wonders if Smith read Benjamin Franklin, who, using the pseudonym Silence Dogood,   4
have learned. For the broader learning generally obtained at modern universities, it may be more difficult 
for students to measure what they have learned and to accurately communicate this information to 
academic administrators.  
Third, Smith was apparently not just concerned with what one might call teaching---
communicating knowledge possessed by a professor. He seems to have been interested in the level of 
faculty knowledge, which shall be referred to herein as scholarship.
4 When Smith bemoaned the poor 
quality of teaching in English universities, he noted the low level of intellectual inquiry in those schools 
(Rosenberg, 1979). He believed schools with smaller endowments that depended on their reputations for 
subsistence were “...obliged to pay more attention to the current opinions of the world.”
5 Further, Smith 
argued (regarding the faculty at well-endowed universities): “If the teacher happens to be a man of sense, 
it must be an unpleasant thing to him to be conscious, while he is lecturing his students, that he is either 
speaking or reading nonsense...”
6 
  In the modern university, students and employers have incomplete knowledge of what students 
have learned. In order to ensure faculty maintain their level of knowledge (scholarship), universities that 
cannot directly observe scholarship may base faculty pay in part on peer evaluation of a measure of 
scholarship---publications. Diamond (1993) suggests university students are not capable of judging what 
or how they should be taught. Lazear (1976) argues publish or perish is a rational response to the inability 
to measure teaching. Paul and Rubin (1984) suggest publications signal faculty knowledge. Siow (1997) 
provides evidence more research serves as a signal of faculty quality and attracts more able students. 
Becker, Lindsay, and Grizzle (2003) demonstrate students pay more to attend schools in which faculty 
engage in research. The latter find more able students are more sensitive to academic quality; thus a 
higher level of publications at a school generates more able student applicants. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
wrote in 1722 about Harvard: “where...they learn little more than how to carry themselves handsomely, and enter a Room genteely, (which might 
as well be acguir’d at a Dancing-School,)...” 
4 As defined in the American Heritage Dictionary (1991, p.1098), scholarship is the “knowledge resulting from study and research in a particular 
field.” 
5 Smith, 1976, p.773.  
6 Smith, 1976, p.763.   5
  Consider the evolution of North American universities as described by Siow (1998). Antebellum 
universities offered a liberal education with few electives and little specialization; teaching was all that 
mattered. Throughout the nineteenth century, there was a shift away from the classics towards science. 
Research-oriented universities were founded in the latter part of the century (John Hopkins in 1879, Clark 
in 1888, and the University of Chicago in 1891). State and land-grant universities emphasized practical 
and technical education and research. Given the changes in higher education since Adam Smith’s era, and 
given Smith’s concern with the level of professorial scholarship, one who supports Smith’s critique of 
higher education might believe professorial pay should be based on student input, to the extent students 
can at least judge teaching in the narrow sense, and on peer-reviewed publications, which serve as a 
measure of scholarship.  
  Although, as discussed above, several authors have suggested publications may signal faculty 
knowledge or scholarship, none has considered a model in which professors spend time in both teaching 
and scholarship when both are inputs into student learning and scholarship is also required for 
publications. Thus, the focus of the rest of this paper is on a model of educational production when 
teaching is imperfectly measured, universities cannot directly observe scholarship, and publications may 
be used as a measure of scholarship.   
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, a model is developed in which both 
student learning and faculty publications are produced in universities (henceforth referred to as schools). 
In this model (used through Section 6), it is assumed schools can not measure (even imperfectly) whether 
students learn; schools can measure (imperfectly) the input of professors in teaching. To highlight 
differences between schools that emphasize either publications or student learning, in Section 3,  schools 
are assumed to produce either publications or student learning (research or teaching schools), but not 
both. The case of either research or teaching schools is further examined in Section 4, where professors 
are assumed to differ in publication productivity. In Section 5, the choice between “piece rates” for 
publications and publication standards is considered. Professorial influence activity is introduced in 
Section 6. In Section 7, the possibility schools can measure (imperfectly) student learning is examined.   6
This case is extended in Section 8 by allowing those who are better in producing publications to also be 
better in producing student human capital. Concluding remarks are contained in Section 9. 
    
2. A model in which schools value student learning and publications. 
  In this section, a simple model is developed in which a school employs professors to teach and to 
do research. Human capital of students, H, is produced using faculty time spent in the classroom, 
preparing lectures, etc. Such time is denoted by “t”. The amount of student human capital produced also 
depends on the knowledge of professors, which is assumed to be a function of the time spent by 
professors in scholarship, y. Time inputs are measured as a fraction of available time, so t+y < 1. A 
simple human capital production function is used: 
 H  =  αt + (1-α)y.                                                                                                                            (1) 
  The assumed human capital production function allows us to ignore complementarities between t 
and y; neither is necessary for some learning to take place, but, as long as 0 < α < 1, both will be used to 
produce H.
7 Schools value the amount of human capital produced and the number of publications by the 
faculty
8, q. Herein, H and q are joint products of y, the time spent by a professor in scholarship. For 
simplicity, normalize the price of a unit of this joint product to one dollar. Let 1-β be the price of a unit of 
H,  0 < β < 1, with β the price of a unit of q.
9 By normalizing the price of the joint product to one dollar, 
we are able to see the effects of a change in the relative prices of H and q, given the price for the joint 
product. 
                                                      
7 The initial level of faculty knowledge is suppressed. With the assumed human capital production function, one could argue the ability to 
produce some student human capital, even if y = 0, implies some initial level of faculty knowledge. Note, faculty knowledge depreciates fairly 
rapidly. McDowell (1982) finds a depreciation rate of about 13% for three year intervals, based on referencing patterns in economics journals. 
Presumably, for much of one’s teaching career, some current faculty scholarship (which does not mean publication) is necessary for students to 
learn the accepted wisdom of a discipline. Lower depreciation rates were found by McDowell for other social sciences, with higher rates found 
for physical and biological sciences. 
8 Clearly q can be thought of as some observable measure of both quantity and quality of publications, where the latter could be measured by 
citations. For brevity, q will be referred to as the number of publications.  
9 Although β and 1-β are referred to as prices, they could just as well reflect the preferences of a school for these two activities. The analysis 
herein is unaffected by whether β reflects market prices, preferences, or some combination thereof.   7
For want of a better objective function, a school is assumed to be a profit-maximizing entity.
10 
Let the number of students and faculty both be normalized to one, and the school’s payment to a professor 
equal W. A school then wishes to maximize: 
 (1-β)H + βq - W.                                                                                                                           (2) 
  A decrease in β implies an increase in the value of student learning relative to publications. 
Assume publications are produced by the simple production function q = by, b > 0. Time spent by a 
professor in scholarship becomes relatively more important in producing publications than it is in student 
learning the larger are b and α. For now assume only one type of professor.
11 
  Using teaching evaluations, peer review, and informal feedback, a school can imperfectly 
measure teaching. Forbes and Paul (1991) argue the widespread use of student evaluation of teaching is 
due to the ability of such instruments to measure “delivery”. They argue students have a difficult time 
measuring faculty knowledge. In the context of the model herein, this argument suggests it is much easier 
for students to measure t than it is for them to measure H. Assume there is an imperfect measure of t, 
denoted by s, which shall be referred to as student evaluation, although, as suggested above, peer 
evaluations and other mechanisms may contribute to s. The following relationship is assumed: 
 s  =  λt + (1-λ)z,                                                                                                                              (3) 
where 0 < λ < 1 and z is some measure independent of t and H. Initially, z is assumed to be exogenous 
and, as demonstrated below, plays no significant role for now. Later we will consider the cases when a 
professor can affect z, and when there are exogenous differences in z among professors.  
  Since a school can not directly measure t or y, it can not base pay on either of these variables. 
However, t can be inferred from s, and y can be inferred from q, so a school can base pay on s and q. 
Ignoring more complicated pay schemes, and setting alternative professor earnings equal to zero, there are 
two basic methods a school can employ. First, it can set a standard for faculty in terms of an acceptable 
                                                      
10 Hosios (2003) models a university run by scholars who (by majority rule) choose compensation and performance evaluation rules. He assumes 
scholars’ ability is known. In order to deal herein with the information problem universities face when trying to judge what students have learned, 
it is more convenient to focus on  university administrators choosing compensation schemes and performance standards. 
11Additional time required to transform scholarship into publications is ignored. See the discussion in Section 8.   8
level of the number of publications and of the rating in student evaluations of teaching; call these levels Q 
and S, respectively. Alternatively, the school can pay per unit of q and s. For example, if Wq and Ws are 
the wage rates per unit of q and s respectively, then a professor’s wage equals Wqq + Wss. Although both 
methods yield similar results, if a school knows the cost function for professor effort, the second approach 
is more expensive because a professor earns rent on infra-marginal units of t and y. It is cheaper for a 
school to infer t and y, and then compensate a professor for the cost of effort.
12 
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  Now a school maximizes {(1-β)H + βq - W} subject to eqs.(1), (4), and (5), and  
W = t
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12 Chen and Ferris (1999) model a school that does not value publications per se, but uses publications as a standard for tenure in order to 
measure faculty human capital. However, pay is not based on publications, so there is no way to measure faculty knowledge post-tenure. They 
argue faculty do not like publication-based pay because of randomness in the publication process. However, they use a two-period model;  in  a 
multi-period model, randomness will be less important as good years cancel out bad ones. Herein, the tenure process is ignored, and the focus is 
on how pay can motivate faculty to continuously maintain their knowledge.  




∂  = 0.   9
  Consider the effect of the five exogenous variables---z, λ, α, b, and β---on a school’s optimal 
choice of S and Q. 
 
A change in the amount of “error” in evaluating teaching 
  An increase in z, given λ, implies more error
14 in the evaluation of teaching, s. We have: 
. 0 and , 0 z
Q
z
S = > ∂
∂
∂
∂  Since a school can infer t from s, and pays a wage that simply compensates for the 
effort cost of teaching and scholarship, there is no cost to a school from a higher value of z. To offset an 
increase in z, a school simply raises S, keeping t unchanged (see below). Since a larger value of z does 
not change the optimal (to a school) level of t, it is not surprising the optimal publication standard is also 
unaffected by z. 
 
A change in the accuracy of evaluating teaching 
 If  λ increases, the evaluation of teaching is more accurate. We have: 
() . 0 z and , 0 2
1 S Q
≥




∂ − = =  A change in λ has no impact on the optimal publication standard, and it has 
an uncertain impact on the optimal teaching standard. The first effect of an increase in λ on S is a larger 
weight for t in s implies S is more valuable. However, a lower weight for z in s means a smaller S is 
required to induce a given value of t. 
 
A change in the weight of teaching vs. scholarship in human capital production 
 If  α increases, teaching becomes more valuable relative to scholarship in student learning. Not 
surprisingly, a larger α implies a higher teaching standard and a lower standard for publications:  α ∂
∂S  > 0, 
and  α ∂
∂Q  < 0. 
 
                                                      
14Again, z is not an “error” in the sense of a random variable; it is constant and---for now---exogenous and identical for all professors.   10
A change in the marginal product of scholarship in publication 
  An increase in b means the marginal product of scholarship (y) in publications is higher. This 
should have no impact on the teaching standard, but should induce a school to raise the publication 
standard since a larger b implies less scholarship is required to produce any level of publications. Indeed: 
. 0 and , 0 b
Q
b
S > = ∂
∂
∂
∂   
 
A change in the relative value of student learning vs. publications 
 If  β increases, the value of publications to a school increases relative to the value of student 







∂ α − − = <  An increased value of publications relative to 
student learning induces a reduction in the teaching standard, but has an ambiguous effect on the 
publication standard. An increase in β possibly causing a lower publication standard may be appear to be 
strange, but the explanation is simple. The value of a unit of publications to a school is β, and the value of 
a unit of student human capital is (1-β); Q and H are joint products of y (faculty time in scholarship), and 
the combined market price of this joint product equals $1. If 1-α > b, the marginal product of y in student 
learning exceeds the marginal product of y in publications. As β increases, the price of the joint product 
of y is unchanged, but the value of publications has increased relative to that of student learning. The joint 
product in which y is more valuable---student learning, H---is now valued less, so a school optimally 
produces less of the joint products, demands less of both teaching time (t) and scholarship (y), and 
consequently sets a lower publication standard (along with a lower standard for teaching evaluation, S). 
  Thus, the possible result considered ( β ∂
∂Q  < 0) is not bizarre. Schools with a relatively high value 
of y in student learning would be adversely impacted by an increase in the market’s relative value of 
publications. If the marginal product of scholarship in publication production, b, exceeds the marginal 
value of scholarship in student learning, (1-α), then a larger weight for publications in a school’s 
objective function will lead to a higher publication standard.    11
 
The level of time spent in teaching and scholarship 
  Using eqs.(4) - (7), we have: 
 t  =  ()
,
2
1 β − α
                                                                                                                                (8) 
 y  = () () [] β − α − + β 1 1 b
2
1
.                                                                                                             (9) 
  Clearly, t is positively related to α and negatively related to β. Also, y is positively related to b 
and negatively related to α. The effect of β on y is unclear for the same reasons given above for why  β ∂
∂Q  





∂ α − − =  The total time spent on teaching and research,  
t+y ≡ τ, is: 
  τ =  () [] . 1 b
2
1
β − + β                                                                                                                     (10) 
 If  β = 0, so the value of publications is zero, τ = ½.  If
15 β = 1, τ =  2
b . Also,  () . 1 b 2
1 − = β ∂
τ ∂  If  
b < (1-α), both t and y fall as β increases. If (1-α) < b < 1, an increase in β causes a reduction in t that 
exceeds the increase in y, so τ falls. Only if b > 1 is τ positively related to β: the marginal product of 
scholarship in publications) has to exceed one---the marginal (unweighted) value of a unit of student 
human capital---in order for total work time to be positively related to β. 
 
3. Teaching and research schools. 
  Consider schools that face different prices for teaching and publications, possibly because they 
attract different types of students. In order to illuminate differences in behavior between schools with 
different emphases on student learning and publications, suppose a teaching school has β = 0, and a 
research school has β = 1. Thus, the market values the production of one unit of student human capital at 
                                                      
15 If β = 1, τ < 1 given the assumption (see below) b < 2.   12
a teaching school by the same amount it values one unit of publications at a research school---one dollar. 
For now suppose there is one type of professor. In the next section, professors will be allowed to differ in 
their ability to produce research. 
  A research school will maximize {q-Wres}, with Wres the wage paid. With no teaching, the school 
must compensate professors for the time spent in scholarship, so Wres = y
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b
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  If b < 2, Qres =  2
b
2
. If b > 2, Qres = b since this entails a corner solution with y = 1. Note  
y =  () 1 , min 2
b  for a research school. Assume from now on b < 2, so y =  2
b  and Wres =  4
b
2
. The results for a 
teaching school are identical to those in Section 2 with β = 0. Using eqs.(6) and (7): 
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  From eqs.(8) and (9), a teaching school has t =  2
α  and y =  ( )
2
1 α − , so τteach = ½ and  
τres = yres =  2
b . Recall from the previous section (when a school produced both student learning and 
publications), in order for τ to be positively related to β (the “price” of publications), b (the marginal 
product of scholarship in publications) had to exceed one---the marginal (unweighted) value of a unit of 
human capital. Now, with specialized schools, we have a similar requirement for research schools to 
require a greater time input from faculty than teaching schools: b must exceed one.  
Finally, note Qres > Qteach only if b > 1-α, which is the same condition found in the previous 
section for a positive value for  β ∂
∂Q  when there was one type of school. The publication standard at a 
research school exceeds that at a teaching school only if the marginal product of a professor’s scholarship   13
in publications at a research school exceeds the marginal value of scholarship in producing student human 
capital at a teaching school.  
  
4. Different types of professors. 
  If professors differ in relevant characteristics, they may sort between schools that place different 
emphasis on teaching and publications. As in the previous section, suppose research (resp. teaching) 
schools have β equal to one (resp. zero). Two types of professors are assumed. Type One professors (T1s) 
have b = b1, and Type Twos (T2s) have b = b2 < b1. If a teaching school could sort individual professors 
by type, it would be indifferent to hiring either type. Relative to hiring T2s, if it hired T1s, a teaching 
school would simply raise the publication standard to obtain the desired level of scholarship. It could 
obtain the same scholarship and pay the same wage, but with different publication standards, hiring either 
all T1s or all T2s. 
  A research school prefers to hire T1s because such a school is interested in publications and not 
scholarship per se. If T1s are relatively scarce, research schools will bid for them, T1s will collect all of 
the schools’ rent, and Wres will equal  . 2
b
2
1  A more interesting (and possibly more plausible) case is when 
T1s are relatively abundant, so some of them work at teaching schools. Now the wage at research schools 
will equal an amount to compensate T1s for their effort,  4
b
2
1 , plus an amount equal to the rent a T1 could 
earn at a teaching school. Before determining the extent of such rent, if the wage at research schools is bid 
up in order to compete with teaching schools, it is possible T2s may wish to apply to research schools. To 







Q > = .                                                                                                                          (14) 
Thus, a T2 who set y equal to one could not reach the publication standard at a research school, 
and would not apply to such a school.    14
  Now, unless teaching schools can identify a professor’s type, such schools will attract both T1s 
and T2s. Let f equal the fraction of T1s on a faculty at a teaching school. If a teaching school sets a 












= .                                                                                                        (15) 
  Both types of professors will spend the same amount of time in teaching to obtain the level of S 
set by a teaching school. However, T2s must use more time in scholarship to produce a given level of 
publications than T1s, so the former are the marginal job applicants. Unless there are enough T1s to 
satisfy demand at teaching schools, Wteach must compensate T2s for both t and y. Since T1s use less y than 
T2s to obtain any Q, the former earn rent at teaching schools. Also, if 0 < f < 1, teaching schools prefer f 
to be as small as possible (that is prefer hiring T2s to T1s), since such schools desire as high a y as 
possible, given the wage they pay, and are not interested in publications per se. With Wteach = t
2 + 
2
2 y , and 
y given by eq.(15), a teaching school that maximizes {H-Wteach} chooses  teach S as found in eq.(12). A 
teaching school chooses  teach Q optimally by maximizing {H-Wteach}, given H = αt + (1-α)y and  
Wteach = t





Q , which yields: 
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Note eq.(16) only holds for f < 1. If f = 1, T1s are the marginal labor suppliers, and a teaching 
school sets  teach Q  and Wteach to attract them. If f = 1,  teach Q  = 
( )
2
1 b1 α − . If  f = 0,  teach Q  = 
()
2
1 b2 α − . For  
f < 1,  0 f
Qteach < ∂












As f increases, the marginal benefit of increasing Qteach is reduced. With a larger fraction of T1s 
(who use less y to produce any Qteach), there is a smaller increase in y  associated with an increase in 
Qteach, but a school must set the wage to compensate the marginal professors, T2s, even though these 
individuals are a smaller percentage of the faculty as f increases. However, if f = 1, a school only must set  
Qteach and Wteach to induce effort from and attract T1s.  
Although it may seem strange an increase in the fraction of more able publishers would reduce 
the publication standard, the reasons for this result are simple. First, this is not a problem in which a 
school optimally chooses a larger percentage faculty who are more able publishers. Herein, an increase in 
f is a constraint for a school. Second, teaching schools are assumed to place no value on publications per 
se. Third, publication productivity and the ability to produce student learning are independent. In Section 
8, we consider the case when those who are more productive in publications also are more valuable in 
producing student learning. 
 
Which type of school sets the higher publication standard? 
Could teaching schools---which hire those who are, on average, less productive in publications if 
f < 1---set a higher research standard than that set by research schools? Since  0 f
Qteach < ∂
∂  for f < 1, consider 
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1 b  > (1-α)b2, which clearly holds if b1 > 1-α. Also, the condition for no T2s to apply to research schools 
(ineq.(14)) implies 
2
1 b  > 2b2, so, this condition ensures  res Q  >  teach Q  when f = 0, and this holds a 
fortiari for all f < 1. If f = 1,  res Q  >  teach Q  if  b1 > 1-α, the logic of which result was explained at the 
end of Section 3. Thus, assuming the condition for no T2s to apply to a research school holds, unless 
teaching schools attract only the same type of professors as research schools, the former will set a lower 
publication standard than the latter,
16 and, if b1 > 1-α, research schools set a higher publication standard 
than teaching schools regardless of the value of f, and independent of the condition for no T2s to apply to 
research schools. 
 
Time inputs at different schools 
  Using eqs.(12) and (16), at a teaching school: 
 t  = 
2
α
,                                                                                                                                     (17) 
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  At research schools, t = 0, and y =  2
b1 . With y2 > y1, T2s spend more time on the job at teaching 
schools than do T1s. Now T2s at teaching schools spend less time on the job than T1s at research schools 
if:  











+ − α − + α .                                                                                                (20) 
                                                      
16 Of course, this result depends on the assumption a research school values an additional unit of publications by the same amount a teaching 
school values an additional unit of student human capital.   17
  Note the LHS of ineq.(20) is inversely related to f. Thus, the greatest chance ineq.(20) would not 
hold---and T2s at teaching schools would spend more time at work than T1s at research schools---is when 
f = 0. If f→ 0, the LHS of ineq.(20)→1, so, again, b1 > 1 is required for time on the job at research 
schools to exceed that at teaching schools. The condition b1 > 1 implies the marginal product of 
scholarship in publications exceeds the marginal value of a unit of student learning, H; only if b1 < 1 
would faculty at teaching schools spend more time on the job than the faculty at research schools. 
 
Wages at different schools 
  A teaching school pays a wage that just compensates a T2 for teaching and scholarship. This 
wage also just compensates a T1 for teaching, but implies rent for such an individual since a T1 uses less 
time to produce any Q than does a T2. The amount of this rent is given by: 
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  Now, in order to attract a T1 to a research school, Wres must compensate a T1 for both the effort 
cost of producing publications,  4
b
2




∂  < 0, the 
more T1s who can not find employment in research schools and are employed in teaching schools  
(df > 0), the lower is Wres. We have: 
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  For a teaching school, Wteach = t
2 + 
2
2 y . Using eqs.(12), (15), and (16), we have: 
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 Note  f
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> , so a decrease in f increases Wteach 
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  The LHS of ineq.(24) is a positive function of f. To understate the possibility Wres > Wteach, 







1 b 1 b b α − + α > .                                                                                                           (24’) 
  Clearly ineq.(24’) holds if b1 > 1. Otherwise, it is possible teaching schools pay more than 
research schools, but this requires b1 < 1, and is more likely the larger is b2, given b1. Thus, if the 
difference between professor types in the marginal product of scholarship in publications is small  
enough---so rent for the more able publishers at teaching schools (and thus the wage for these individuals 
at research schools) is small enough---it is possible teaching schools pay more than research schools. 
  From ineq.(14), b2 <  2
b
2
1  for T2s not to apply to research schools. Since a larger value for b2 
implies the smallest possibility Wres > Wteach,  suppose b2 =  2
b
2












> .                                                                                                                    (24”) 
  Ineq.(24”) illustrates what is sufficient for Wres > Wteach if b2 is as large and f is as small as 
possible. If, for example, α = .5, so teaching and faculty scholarship have equal value in student human 
capital production, Wres > Wteach if b1 > .516. If α = .75, b1 must exceed .756 in order for Wres to exceed 
Wteach. If α = .25,  b1 must exceed .27 for Wres > Wteach. Thus, as a rough approximation, a sufficient 
condition for research schools to pay a higher wage than teaching schools is the marginal product of 
scholarship in publications at research schools, b1, exceeds the marginal value of teaching in human 
capital production at teaching schools, α. Combined with our earlier results---research schools set higher 
publication standards than teaching schools---elite undergraduate institutions (those with a high value for 
α) that would fit our definition of a teaching school might pay high salaries relative to research schools 
and base pay in part on publications, even though they place little or no value on publications per se.   19
 
Profit at research schools 
  If somehow teaching schools could sort out T1s from T2s, they would hire only one type of 
professor. If only T1s were hired, they would earn no rent at teaching schools. Thus, as shown before, a 
research school would pay a wage equal to  4
b
2
1 , and have Q equal to  2
b
2
1 , and profit equal to  4
b
2
1 . With T1s 
mixed with T2s at teaching schools (0 < f < 1), research schools must pay a wage that reflects the rent 
earned by T1s at teaching schools. It has not been demonstrated it is profitable for a research school to 
operate when it must compensate its faculty for the rent they could earn at a teaching school. Using 












































.                                                                             (25) 
Since πres is positively related to both f and α, if πres|f=α=0 > 0, then πres > 0 for all values of f and 
α. We have: 





















.                                                                                                 (25’) 
If b1 > 1, πres|f=α=0 > 0. In general, if b2 = γb1, with γ < 1, πres|f=α=0 > 0 if 
2
1 b  + γ
2 > 1. A larger value for γ 
implies a smaller gap between b1 and b2, which, as shown above, means a lower Wres due to less rent for 
T1s at teaching schools. 
 
5. Will teaching schools use “piece rates” for research?
17 
  In Section 2, it was argued paying a “piece rate”---a per unit payment for s and q---was 
dominated by requiring a standard for s and q and compensating professors for the effort required to reach 
those standards. Paying a piece rate for either s or q implies infra-marginal rent for professors. However, 
                                                      
17 Since, by assumption (ineq.(14)), research schools only attract one type of professor (T1s), for those schools, a piece rate is dominated by a 
publication standard, as explained in Section 3.    20
that argument applied to the case when only one type of professor was employed at a school. In the last 
section, teaching schools employed two types of professors, T1 and T2. In that case, T1s earned rent with 
a publication standard. Compensation for teaching effort was just sufficient to cover the effort cost for 
either type of professor. The question considered now is whether a piece rate for publications could 
dominate a publication standard when two types of professors are employed at a teaching school. 
It is easy to show the teaching standard will be the same as before (eq.(12)). Using eqs.(12), (15), 
and (16), and the fact y1 = 
1 b
q , and y2 = 
2 b
q , a teaching school’s optimal choice of S and Q yields t, y1, y2, 
and 
Q , S teach π : 
 t  = 
2
α
,                                                                                                                                         (26) 
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.                                                                      (29) 
  A teaching school using a piece rate for q will set the same level of S as it would using a 
performance standard for publications (eq.(12)), which results in t =  2
α . With Wq paid per publication, a 
professor of type “j”, j =1,2, will choose yj to maximize { }
2
j j j q y y b W − , so qj =  2
b W
2
j q , and 
() [] 2 1 2
W b f 1 fb y
q − + = . Maximizing 
q W , S teach π  with respect to Wq yields: 
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.                                                                  (31)   21
  Using eqs.(29) and (31), 
Q , S teach π  < 
q W , S teach π  if: 
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.                                                                                    (32) 
  If there are few T1s at teaching schools, paying a piece rate is less likely to dominate a 
publication standard. If f = 0, ineq.(32) becomes 2 < 1, so a piece rate is not more profitable than a 









1 b 2 b > , 
paying a piece rate dominates a publication standard.
18 From ineq.(14),  2
2
1 b 2 b >  for no T2s to apply to 
research schools. Thus, if b2 < 1, ineq.(32) holds, and a piece rate dominates a publication standard with a 
large enough fraction of T1s at research schools.
19 However, if b2  > 1, it is possible to have ineq.(14)  
hold---so no T2s apply to research schools---and not have ineq.(32) hold---so piece rates would not 
dominate a publication standard at teaching schools regardless of the fraction of T1s at teaching schools.
20 
A larger value of b2, given b1, implies less rent for T1s at teaching schools when the publication standard 
is used, and thus less likelihood a piece rate is more profitable than a publication standard. 
 
6. Professorial influence activity. 
  As discussed in Section 1, Adam Smith believed basing faculty pay on student fees paid directly 
to professors would increase the likelihood faculty would engage in scholarship. However, there is a 
contradiction in Smith’s discussion of this issue. At one point, he seems to suggest a professor can easily 
convince students the professor has suitable knowledge, even if it is not the case. “The slightest degree of 
knowledge and application will enable him to do this without exposing himself to contempt or derision, or 
saying anything that is really foolish, absurd, or ridiculous.”
21   
                                                      
18 If f = 1, only T1s are employed at teaching schools, b2 is replaced with b1 in ineq.(32), and the inequality does not hold: as suggested in Section 
2, a publication standard dominates a piece rate. For f < 1, an increase in f  makes it more likely a piece rate dominates a publication standard. 
19 See the Appendix for a more complete proof of this argument. 
20 For example, if b2 = 2
.5 = 1.414 and b1 = 1.9, 
2
1 b  = 3.61 and 2b2 = 2.828, so ineq.(14) holds, but 2
2
2 b  = 4, so a piece rate is dominated by a 
publication standard. 
21 Smith, 1976, p.763.   22
It would appear Smith believed  professors could engage in influence activity
22 in order to affect 
evaluations of them. Such activity makes evaluations less valuable, and thus merits consideration. In this 
section, the possibility professors can convince students the former have provided more education than 
they actually have is considered.  
Suppose there is one type of school, there is one type of professor, and β = 0. Thus publications 




2, and θ < 1. Influence activity is assumed to be less costly to a professor than either 
teaching or research. Now s = λt + (1-λ)(z0+i), so t = 
( )
λ
+ λ − − ) i z ( ) 1 S 0 . A professor will choose i to minimize 
{t
2 + θi
2} subject to t = t(i) from the previous sentence. This yields:  





z 1 S 1
λ − + θλ
λ − − λ −
,                                                                                                           (33) 






λ − + θλ
λ − − λθ
.                                                                                                               (34) 
  Now t > i only if θ >  λ
λ − 1 . If λ < ½,  λ
λ − 1  > 1, so, with θ < 1, we have i > t: if s, the evaluation of 
teaching is relatively inaccurate, so more weight is placed on z than on t, a professor will spend more time 
in influence activity than in teaching. 
  Maximizing profit, with the wage set to just induce professors to be willing to work here, we have  
W = C = t
2+y
2+θi
2.  A school chooses S and Q, which, as before with one type of professor, implies  
Q =  ()
2
1 b α − . As in Section 2, y =  2
1 α − . Deriving S optimally, and substituting in for t and i, we have: 
 S  =  () [ ]
θλ




,                                                                                                               (35) 
  t =  
2
α
,                                                                                                                                        (36) 





.                                                                                                                             (37)  
                                                      
22 Milgrom and Roberts (1988) were the first to analyze influence activity.    23
  Both t and y are the same as if there were no influence activity---the case in Section 2 with  
β = 0. With no influence activity, total time on the job, τ, equals ½. With influence activity, τ > ½. If the 
evaluation of teaching is highly accurate (λ→1), then influence activity approaches zero.
23 The amount of 
time spent in influence activity is positively related to the weight for teaching in student human capital 
production (α), and is negatively related to the marginal cost of influence activity (reflected in θ) and the 
accuracy of the evaluation of teaching (λ). 
  Unless influence activity is so large the time constraint binds (see f.n.21), a school induces the 
same amount of teaching and scholarship it would have if there were no influence activity. However, 
influence activity is costly since, in order to attract professors, a school must compensate them for the 
effort they expend---including effort in influence activity.  
 
7. Evaluations can measure (imprecisely) human capital. 
  To this point, it has been assumed imprecise evaluation of teaching was possible, but a school, 
using student teaching evaluations or other techniques, could not measure, even imperfectly, the amount 
of human capital produced. As discussed in Section 1, modern universities, in which a relatively broad set 
of skills is generally obtained, should find it easier to obtain some measure of professors’ teaching input 
than to assess how much human capital has been obtained by students. However, for completeness, the 
possibility of imperfect measurement of human capital production at a school is considered in this section. 
  Consider the following case: there is one type of school and professor, β = 0, and there is no 
influence activity. With H = αt + (1-α)y, the evaluation of the faculty now yields a measure s: 
 s  =  ψH + (1-ψ)z = ψαt + ψ(1-α)y + (1-ψ)z.                                                                              (38) 
  Suppose no publication standard is set by a school, but a teaching standard of S is imposed. Now 
a school knows a professor will minimize C = t
2 + y
2, subject to s = S. Solving S for y: 
                                                      
23 Note, with influence activity, t+y+i ≡ τ < 1 if 
()
λ
λ − α 1
 < θ. Thus, θ must be sufficiently large or the time constraint will bind.    24
 y  =  ()
() α − ψ
ψ − − ψα −
1
z 1 t S
.                                                                                                            (39) 
  A professor chooses t to minimize C, subject to eq.(39). This yields: 




α − + α ψ
ψ − − α
,                                                                                                                (40) 
 y  =  () () []
() []
2 2 1
z 1 S 1
α − + α ψ
ψ − − α −
.                                                                                                          (41) 
  A school chooses S to maximize {H-W} subject to W = C and eqs.(40) and (41). This yields: 
 S  =  () [] () z 1 1
2
2 2 ψ − + α − + α
ψ
.                                                                                             (42) 
  Using eqs.(40)-(42), t =  2
α , and y =  2
1 α − . Thus, when human capital produced at a school is 
capable of being measured, albeit imperfectly, without using a publication standard, a school is able to 
induce the levels of teaching and scholarship it could obtain when only teaching can be measured and a 
school has to use a publication standard. Without a direct value for publications (β > 0), schools would 
appear to have no reason to require publications when human capital production can be, even imperfectly, 
measured.  
 
8. Better scholars produce more student human capital 
  The possibility professors differ in the ability to produce publications was considered in Sections 
4 and 5 above. However, what has yet to be considered is the case when professors differ in ability as an 
input in student learning. Specifically, consider the possibility more able scholars are more valuable in the 
production of student learning. As George Stigler argued: 
 
A capable research scholar has a deeper knowledge than the non-scholar: one treats a subject with much 
more care if one’s thoughts are going to be published and reviewed by hawk-eyed colleagues. A research 
scholar in general has a higher level of energy than the non-scholar. Of course there are research scholars 
who are so magnificently incomprehensible and one-sided that in simple mercy to students they should be 
forbidden to enter a classroom. For ever such creature there are surely a dozen lazy, poorly informed non-  25





  Following Stigler’s argument, suppose we again have two types of professors, T1s and T2s, 
where T1s have b = b1 and T2s have b = b2. Further, suppose b1 > 1 and b2 = 1. Also, as has been assumed 
before, let β = 0 (so publications have no direct value to a school). Now the human capital production 
function for students is assumed to be: 
 H j = αtj + (1-α)bjyj,                                                                                                                     (43) 
with j = 1, 2 indexing the type of professor. Thus, with the same amount of time spent in scholarship, a T1 
can produce more publications and more student knowledge than a T2. Now a school would prefer to hire 
T1s than T2s. Assuming, as in the previous section, s = ψH + (1-ψ)z, if a school set a standard for 
teaching evaluation, S, a T1 could obtain such a standard with a smaller time input. Thus, a wage that just 
compensated T1s for their effort would not compensate T2s, so the latter would not apply. However, 
since T1s have a comparative advantage in publication and in the input of their knowledge in student 
learning, it may be the case T2s have a comparative advantage in convincing students the latter have 
learned. Thus let z2 > z1. Further, to reduce notation, suppose z1 = 0.  
  Consider a school that could distinguish T1s from T2s. A T2 faced with a standard for evaluation 
of teaching, S, will minimize {t
2+y
2} with respect to t, subject to y = y(t) (eq.(39) with  z = z2 and b2 = 1). 
With s = ψH  for a T1, using eq.(43), a T1 minimizes {t
2+y
2} with respect to t, subject to: 




.                                                                                                                          (44)  
  The cost-minimizing values of t and y for a T2 are found in eqs.(40) and (41) (with z = z2), and 
lead to a school choosing S as in eq.(42) (again with z = z2). As in the previous section, a T2 would set t 
equal to  2
α  and y equal to  2
1 α − . A school hiring only T2s would have profit, π2, of: 
                                                      
24 Stigler, 1989, p.17.   26




α − + α .                                                                                                                (45)  
  A school hiring only T1s will choose a profit-maximizing S,  S1 that leads to t1, y1, and π1:  
  1 S  =  () []
2
1
2 2 b 1
2
α − + α
ψ




,                                                                                                                                        (47) 
 y 1 =  ()
2
b 1 1 α −
,                                                                                                                           (48) 
  π1 =   () []
2
1
2 2 b 1
4
1
α − + α .                                                                                                         (49) 
 With  b1 > 1, π1 > π2: thus a school wishes to hire only T1s. It should also be clear a school prefers 
all T1s to some mixture of T1s and T2s. Consider whether T2s would earn rent if a school set S to just 
attract T1s (eq.(46)). For a T2, s = ψH + (1-ψ)z2 and H = αt + (1-α)y. Thus, with S = S1: 
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2 2 z 1 b 1
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1
.                                                       (51) 
  Using eqs.(47) and (48), a school that wants to attract only T1s will set a wage, W1, to just cover 
the effort cost of this type of professor: 
 W 1 =  () []
2
1
2 2 b 1
4
1
α − + α .                                                                                                        (52) 




2 y t + , a T2 will apply to a school that sets S = S1 with no publication standard. Using 
eqs.(50)-(52), a T2 will earn rent at a school with S1 if: 
  () [] ()
2
2
2 2 2 z 1 J
2
4 1 J ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ ψ − −
ψ
> α − + α ψ ,                                                                               (53)   27
where J ≡  ()
2
1
2 2 b 1 α − + α .  Now ineq.(53) is not very intuitive. However, if b1→1 = b2,  ineq.(53) 
becomes 2z2(1-ψ) > 0. If T2s are identical to T1s in the ability to publish and produce student learning, 
but T2s have z2 > 0 = z1, then T2s can obtain a given evaluation standard, S, using less time in teaching 
and scholarship than T1s.
25                                                              
  Since ineq.(53) holds for low enough values for b1, T2s may earn rent at a school that sets S = S1. 











1 α − . With  
s = ψH + (1-ψ)z2 for a T2, to produce  1 S , t2 = 
( )
αψ
ψ − α −
2 z 1
2 . Now a T2 would not apply to a school with  










2 y t + , which reduces to: 
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.                                                                      (54) 
In general, ineq.(54) may hold, and is more likely to hold the larger is b1, and when the evaluation 
of teaching becomes more accurate.
26 Thus, even if the evaluation of teaching may reveal (imperfectly) 
the amount of human capital produced, if some professors are more productive in both publication and 
student learning, and others are more able to “fool” evaluators (have a larger value for z), a publication 
standard may be required to induce the latter types not to apply. Note this result does not require schools 
place any direct value on publications (β = 0).  
Consider an example that illustrates what may be required for ineq.(54) to hold. Suppose the 
evaluation method, s, is 50% accurate, and 50% of student learning is from teaching time, so α = ψ = ½ . 
Then the inequality becomes: 







.                                                                                                             (54’) 
                                                      
25 Using eqs.(47), (48), (50), and (51), if b1→1, t2 < t1 =  2
α , and y2 < y1 =  2
1 α −  if z2 > 0. 
 
26 If ψ→1, the LHS of ineq.(54)→0.    28
  The LHS of ineq.(54’) is maximized when z2 = 1/8, or when the LHS equals 1/16. Thus, 




1 −  > 1, which occurs if b1 > 1.273. In this case, T1s have to be about 27% 
more productive in publications and student learning  than T2s in order for a school’s desired publication 
standard for T1s to deter T2s from applying.
27 
  If ineq.(54) does not hold, then a school would choose between pooling---hiring both T1s and 
T2s---and setting an even higher publication standard in order to induce T2s not to apply. The latter 
scenario implies T1s separate themselves from T2s via an excessive level of publications---the classic 
signaling result in Spence (1974).  
  Ignored herein is any additional time (beyond y) required to turn scholarship into publications. If 
such additional time is required, the wage would have to increase to compensate professors for their 
additional effort, which implies a publication standard would be less profitable for a school. However, if 
T1s have a comparative advantage in publication time, as they do in y, additional time required for 
publications would be more costly for T2s than T1s, suggesting a publication standard is even more likely 
to deter T2s from applying. 
  
 9. Conclusion 
  In this paper, a model was considered in which scholarly activity by faculty is an input in student 
learning and may be measured by publications. A number of results were derived, only a few of which 
will be summarized now. With two types of professors, unless teaching schools attract only the same 
types of professors as research schools, the former will set a lower publication standard than the latter. 
Additionally, as a rough approximation, a sufficient condition for research schools to pay a higher wage 
than teaching schools is the marginal product of scholarship in publications at the former must exceed the 
marginal value of teaching in human capital production at the latter. Thus, allowing for differences in the 
marginal value of teaching in schools (that is, different αs), the model herein could explain why some 
                                                      
27 When ψ = α = .5, z2 = .125, and b1 = 1.273, ineq.(53) holds: T2s would apply to a school that set S to just attract T1s and did not set a 
publication standard.    29
elite undergraduate schools might pay relatively high salaries (because α is high for them) and require 
publications, even though they place little or no value on publications per se. 
In general, publications may be desired directly and to measure the knowledge (scholarship) of 
the faculty. If a university can only measure teaching (i.e. the input of the faculty into student learning), 
publications may be used to measure faculty knowledge for a given type of professor attracted. If a 
university can imperfectly measure student learning, publications may be necessary to induce less able 
professors not to apply.  
  Adam Smith was concerned with the level of faculty scholarship. His proposal---direct payment 
of faculty by students---may have been sensible when education was essentially a consumption good, the 
value of which was fairly easy to observe by students. Today, given students and employers have 
incomplete knowledge of what the former have learned, pay based partially on peer-reviewed 
publications, in order to ensure faculty maintain their level of scholarship, and on student input, to the 
extent students can imperfectly judge either teaching in the narrow sense or what they have learned, may 
be optimal to accomplish Smith’s objectives.    30
Appendix  
A piece rate versus a publication standard for teaching schools. 
  Using inequality (32), differentiate the left-hand side (LHS) and the right-hand side (RHS) with 
respect to f: 
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 Setting 0 f
RHS = ∂
∂  yields: 
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+ < f < 1 (with f < 1 implying some T2s are employed at  
teaching schools), an increase in f lowers the LHS and raises the RHS of ineq.(32), implying a piece rate  
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